Publications

The 2002 Defense Authorization Act requires the Secretary of Defense to submit a report on the Defense Department’s efforts in counterterrorism and homeland security. The report is due to be released this month. A particular area of Congressional interest is the future use of the Reserve Component.1 Stretching back to their roots as colonial militias, America’s citizen-soldiers have historically played a key part in protecting the homeland. In the wake of the September 11 attacks, many expect the role of the Reserves to be greatly expanded. Several major studies have already called for homeland security to become the Reserve Component’s primary mission.2 Will the Department of Defense heed their call? The department is not approaching the issue with a blank sheet of paper. The 1999 Reserve Component Employment 2005 Study (RCE-05), the Defense Department’s most detailed, wide-ranging analysis of the Reserves’ potential contributions to homeland security, reveals what has been done so far and why the prospects for further change are not bright.

The once mighty U.S. Navy is in precipitous decline. At least, that is what a vocal group of naval officers, defense analysts and Congressional leaders strongly believe. They support their judgment by comparing the number of ships in the Navy’s “Total Ship Battle Force” with those of past U.S. fleets. Their most common standard for comparison is the “600-ship” fleet championed by John Lehman, President Ronald Reagan’s first, most aggressive and politically savvy, Secretary of the Navy. When compared to that number, the 316 ships of the Fiscal Year

Today the US military finds itself in a period of large-scale change in the conduct of warfare. There is wide verbal acceptance in American military circles that we are in the midst of a military revolution, or “revolution in military affairs” that will require a transformation of the US armed forces. Yet despite the rhetoric, the American military is not conducting the kind of Joint and Service field exercises  characteristic of military organizations engaged in transformation.

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has suggested that his department could save $15 billion a year through efficiencies if given the freedom to do so. Numerous studies have also asserted the potential for efficiencies in the Department of Defense (DoD), some arguing that savings could total $30 billion a year or more. Actual savings, however, appear much more modest. Why is it hard for DoD to achieve efficiency savings? How can the department promote efficiencies more effectively?

Critical to the Bush Administration’s ongoing review of national security requirements and strategy is the question of how much the Department of Defense (DoD) should spend on the development and procurement of new weapon systems. More than any other military in recent history, the US military has a tradition of investing in and relying upon advanced weapon systems and other equipment to give it a crucial edge in capabilities. Few doubt that the United States needs to continue relying on, and exploiting, its advantages in weapons technology.

The US military is currently investing billions of dollars annually in developing and deploying a broad range of new precision-guided and electronic-strike weapons. These weapons are revolutionizing the way military organizations are thinking about future conflict. Perhaps nowhere are the potential implications of these weapons more significant than in the case of nuclear forces and strategic-strike operations. For the last forty years, the US strategic deterrent has centered on a triad of intercontinental bombers and land- and sea-based ballistic missile forces.