Publications

The research and analysis underlying this report began in 2003 and aimed at answering the following question. How has the maturation of non-nuclear guided munitions during the late 1980s and early 1990s affected the conduct of warfare by advanced militaries, especially by the various combat arms of the US armed forces? In this context, guided munitions were understood to be those that could actively home on their targets or aim-points after being fired, released, or launched.

The United States currently possess an arsenal of about 3,950 “operationally deployed” strategic nuclear warheads. These weapons are deployed on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and long-range bombers. These weapon systems are capable of striking targets located anywhere on the globe, and causing enormous destruction. The explosive power of the individual warheads carried by these systems ranges from as little as 0.3 kilotons (equivalent to 300 tons of TNT) to as much as 1.2 megatons (equivalent to 1.2 million tons of TNT). Under Bush Administration plans, the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons will be reduced to 1,700-2,200 warheads by the end of 2012.

“Seabasing” is a new defense buzzword of growing importance and prominence in both joint and naval circles. Unfortunately, despite the increasingly common use of the term by both joint and naval planners alike, there still remains much mystery and misunderstanding about this important “new” concept. Indeed, one of the key problems that has hindered meaningful debate and discussion about seabasing—and especially the priorities revealed in its associated plans and programs—is that its contemporary definition and the important ideas that support it are poorly understood except among the relatively small group of officers and  planners who have been intimately involved with their development.

The global naval competition is an enduring “race” between an ever-changing, disparate group of competitors. A few select competitors enter the race to “win”—to become the number one contemporary naval power. Other competitors enter the race for nationally important but more modest goals, such as becoming a respected regional navy. Still others enter the race only to be part of the sea-going “community of commercial interests and righteous ideals,” with no intention of competing against stronger, more capable naval opponents.

This report provides a point-of-departure framework for developing a post-9/11 defense posture. Its purpose is to assist those charged either with crafting the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) or evaluating it.

This report has two main thrusts: first, to articulate the prospective role of long-range strike (LRS) in future US military strategy; and, second, to explore American LRS needs in the mid- to long-term.