News

Future US Nuclear Spending Likely to Remain Strong

August 11, 2015 Defense News

Modernization costs for America’s aging nuclear arsenal will be expensive but will not exceed 5 percent of national defense spending in the coming decades, according to projections by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

CSBA Study Says Modernizing Nuclear Triad Is Affordable

August 6, 2015 SEAPOWER

A Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment (CSBA) study released Aug. 4 disputes the widely circulated theory that modernization of the strategic nuclear triad, including replacing the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines and their sea-launched intercontinental missiles, is “unaffordable.”

Report: Upgrading U.S. Nuclear Forces Could be Affordable Under Sequestration

August 6, 2015 USNI News

The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments acknowledges in a new report that modernizing U.S. nuclear forces — with programs such as the Ohio-class replacement ballistic missile submarine — will compete for funds conventional weapons upgrades like the F-35 Lighting II Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).

Nuclear upgrade costs $700 billion over next 25 years, think-tank study estimates

August 6, 2015 Air Force Times

The U.S. will face a “bow wave” of increased costs to update its nuclear arsenal, but operating budgets could thereafter return to levels comparable to today's, according to a new study released by a Washington, D.C. think tank.

Slashing Nukes Won’t Save Much $$: CSBA

August 5, 2015 Breaking Defense

Nuclear weapons are expensive. So are the bombers, missiles, andsubmarines used to deliver them. But in the context of total defense spending, budget guruTodd Harrison argues, they’re a relatively affordable — and strategically critical — part of our armed forces.

Briefs

To Preserve Extended Nuclear Deterrence in Europe an American Should be SACEUR

April 18, 2025 Eric Edelman, Franklin C. Miller

Recent press reports suggest that Pentagon leaders are considering a dramatic organizational change: relinquishing the traditional U.S. role of providing NATO with its Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR). This would be deeply unwise and potentially dangerous for the United States, as well as for our European allies. Since December 1950, when General Dwight D. Eisenhower became the first Supreme Allied Commander of the newly created North Atlantic Alliance, the position has been filled by an American. This is not spelled out in any formal document. Rather, it is a norm that has been honored by the Alliance for almost 80 years because the United States is the alliance’s strongest member. It also serves as an important sign of Washington’s commitment to European defense. And it underpins the forward deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons on the territory of select European NATO members, which remains central to extended deterrence.

Studies

Peaceful Resolution: Reframing U.S. Defense Strategy Toward Taiwan

April 17, 2025 Jack Bianchi

America’s strategic approach to Taiwan is ripe for reevaluation. Although Washington’s sensitivity to Taipei’s security dilemma has increased markedly in recent years, U.S. policy toward Taiwan remains bound by a series of outdated historical understandings. As a result, American policymakers have focused narrowly on arms sales to the island, rather than developing and articulating a new vision for United States-Taiwan security cooperation.

Studies

Relook Playbook: Defense Budgeting Insights From a CSBA Rebalancing Exercise

April 2, 2025 Travis Sharp, Casey Nicastro, Evan B. Montgomery

In February 2025, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth directed the Pentagon to reexamine the 2026 budget request, which has been drafted but not sent to Congress, to ensure that it reflected the Trump administration’s priorities. Specifically, he tasked the military departments and defense agencies with identifying lower-priority activities totaling 8 percent of their projected annual budgets from 2026 to 2030. These lists of potential cuts will create a substantial pool of money available for potential reallocation.

Studies

The Lost Art of the Bargaining Chip? The Case for Gaining Negotiating Leverage for Nuclear Arms Control With Russia and China

February 6, 2025 David A. Cooper

Over the past decade, as Russia and China have enhanced their nuclear capabilities, the United States has sought to negotiate arms control arrangements that would avoid a new nuclear arms race. So far, however, those efforts have proven unsuccessful. As a result, Washington is on track to confront an authoritarian axis of two nuclear peer competitors over the next decade. Meanwhile, its planned nuclear posture still reflects a far more benign threat environment.

Studies

Focused Force: China’s Military Challenge and Australia’s Response

January 13, 2025 Toshi Yoshihara, Jack Bianchi, Casey Nicastro

China’s ambitions, assertiveness, and massive military expansion have stimulated a major shift in Australia’s defense policy. From the AUKUS partnership to new allied posture arrangements to the acquisition of long-range strike capabilities, Australia is carrying out a series of ambitious initiatives to strengthen deterrence. Canberra has further called on the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to become a “focused force” designed to deal with the highest-order dangers. As Australia undergoes this strategic reorientation, it confronts weighty investment and divestment decisions that could have lasting consequences for force structure and posture.

Studies

Putting It All Together: The 2025 Defense Budget Request, Alternative Budget Proposals, and NATO Spending

December 9, 2024 Travis Sharp

With a new administration and new Congress entering office, experts from across the political spectrum have introduced competing proposals for future U.S. defense budgets. The most noteworthy aspect of these proposals is the extraordinary degree to which they differ. One issue driving the differences is NATO military spending. Much attention has centered on NATO members devoting at least 2 percent of their GDP to defense. Despite this attention, research has rarely projected the additional funding and forces that could be generated if all NATO countries met the 2 percent of GDP benchmark—or a higher target.

Peaceful Resolution: Reframing U.S. Defense Strategy Toward Taiwan

Relook Playbook: Defense Budgeting Insights From a CSBA Rebalancing Exercise

The Lost Art of the Bargaining Chip? The Case for Gaining Negotiating Leverage for Nuclear Arms Control With Russia and China

Focused Force: China’s Military Challenge and Australia’s Response

Putting It All Together: The 2025 Defense Budget Request, Alternative Budget Proposals, and NATO Spending

More of the Same? The Future of the Russian Military And Its Ability to Change

Strengthening the Phalanx: Layered, Comprehensive, and Distributed Air and Missile Defense in the Indo-Pacific

Inconsistent Congress: Analysis of the 2024 Defense Budget Request

Evaluate Like We Operate: Why DOD Should Evaluate Weapons Systems as Networked Force Packages, Not Individual Platforms

Extending Deterrence by Detection: The Case for Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems Into the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness

Beyond Precision: Maintaining America’s Strike Advantage in Great Power Conflict

The Decisive Decade: United States–China Competition in Defense Innovation and Defense Industrial Policy in and Beyond the 2020s

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Report Release Webinar: Strengthening the Phalanx: Layered, Comprehensive, and Distributed Air and Missile Defense in the Indo-Pacific

Future US Nuclear Spending Likely to Remain Strong

5 weapons that don’t need a human to pull the trigger

CSBA Study Says Modernizing Nuclear Triad Is Affordable

Report: Upgrading U.S. Nuclear Forces Could be Affordable Under Sequestration

Nuclear upgrade costs $700 billion over next 25 years, think-tank study estimates

Slashing Nukes Won’t Save Much $$: CSBA

Latest Publications

To Preserve Extended Nuclear Deterrence in Europe an American Should be SACEUR

Peaceful Resolution: Reframing U.S. Defense Strategy Toward Taiwan

Relook Playbook: Defense Budgeting Insights From a CSBA Rebalancing Exercise

The Lost Art of the Bargaining Chip? The Case for Gaining Negotiating Leverage for Nuclear Arms Control With Russia and China

Focused Force: China’s Military Challenge and Australia’s Response

Putting It All Together: The 2025 Defense Budget Request, Alternative Budget Proposals, and NATO Spending