News

February 6, 2014 Politico

It’s no surprise that CSBA, CSIS, AEI and CNAS all agreed to cut the Army’s end strength as part of their budget drill. There seems to be fairly broad consensus on that point in Washington (outside of Army Chief of Staff Gen. Ray Odierno’s office). But some of the teams’ other choices, which were unveiled yesterday at a well-attended event on Capitol Hill, were more surprising.

Think Tanks Project Force Structure, Strategy Under Continued Sequestration

February 5, 2014 Seapower Magazine

Four of the nation’s top national security think tanks projected what kind of forces and strategy the U.S. military could sustain if sequestration remains in full effect for the next decade, and the results were chilling.

Platform, Personnel Cuts Likely in FY ‘15 Air Force Budget

February 2, 2014 Air Force Times

This close to the March 4 submission of the fiscal 2015 budget request, getting specifics from service officials can be like pulling teeth. But a number of statements, both in public appearances and during interviews, provide a sense of direction for the Air Force’s plans.

Panel Recommends Reducing Active-Duty Air Force

January 30, 2014 World Herald

A cash-strapped Air Force needs to shift some personnel from its active-duty force to the less-expensive Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve, a high-level panel recommended Thursday morning during congressional hearings in Washington D.C.

Briefs

To Preserve Extended Nuclear Deterrence in Europe an American Should be SACEUR

April 18, 2025 Eric Edelman, Franklin C. Miller

Recent press reports suggest that Pentagon leaders are considering a dramatic organizational change: relinquishing the traditional U.S. role of providing NATO with its Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR). This would be deeply unwise and potentially dangerous for the United States, as well as for our European allies. Since December 1950, when General Dwight D. Eisenhower became the first Supreme Allied Commander of the newly created North Atlantic Alliance, the position has been filled by an American. This is not spelled out in any formal document. Rather, it is a norm that has been honored by the Alliance for almost 80 years because the United States is the alliance’s strongest member. It also serves as an important sign of Washington’s commitment to European defense. And it underpins the forward deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons on the territory of select European NATO members, which remains central to extended deterrence.

Studies

Peaceful Resolution: Reframing U.S. Defense Strategy Toward Taiwan

April 17, 2025 Jack Bianchi

America’s strategic approach to Taiwan is ripe for reevaluation. Although Washington’s sensitivity to Taipei’s security dilemma has increased markedly in recent years, U.S. policy toward Taiwan remains bound by a series of outdated historical understandings. As a result, American policymakers have focused narrowly on arms sales to the island, rather than developing and articulating a new vision for United States-Taiwan security cooperation.

Studies

Relook Playbook: Defense Budgeting Insights From a CSBA Rebalancing Exercise

April 2, 2025 Travis Sharp, Casey Nicastro, Evan B. Montgomery

In February 2025, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth directed the Pentagon to reexamine the 2026 budget request, which has been drafted but not sent to Congress, to ensure that it reflected the Trump administration’s priorities. Specifically, he tasked the military departments and defense agencies with identifying lower-priority activities totaling 8 percent of their projected annual budgets from 2026 to 2030. These lists of potential cuts will create a substantial pool of money available for potential reallocation.

Studies

The Lost Art of the Bargaining Chip? The Case for Gaining Negotiating Leverage for Nuclear Arms Control With Russia and China

February 6, 2025 David A. Cooper

Over the past decade, as Russia and China have enhanced their nuclear capabilities, the United States has sought to negotiate arms control arrangements that would avoid a new nuclear arms race. So far, however, those efforts have proven unsuccessful. As a result, Washington is on track to confront an authoritarian axis of two nuclear peer competitors over the next decade. Meanwhile, its planned nuclear posture still reflects a far more benign threat environment.

Studies

Focused Force: China’s Military Challenge and Australia’s Response

January 13, 2025 Toshi Yoshihara, Jack Bianchi, Casey Nicastro

China’s ambitions, assertiveness, and massive military expansion have stimulated a major shift in Australia’s defense policy. From the AUKUS partnership to new allied posture arrangements to the acquisition of long-range strike capabilities, Australia is carrying out a series of ambitious initiatives to strengthen deterrence. Canberra has further called on the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to become a “focused force” designed to deal with the highest-order dangers. As Australia undergoes this strategic reorientation, it confronts weighty investment and divestment decisions that could have lasting consequences for force structure and posture.

Studies

Putting It All Together: The 2025 Defense Budget Request, Alternative Budget Proposals, and NATO Spending

December 9, 2024 Travis Sharp

With a new administration and new Congress entering office, experts from across the political spectrum have introduced competing proposals for future U.S. defense budgets. The most noteworthy aspect of these proposals is the extraordinary degree to which they differ. One issue driving the differences is NATO military spending. Much attention has centered on NATO members devoting at least 2 percent of their GDP to defense. Despite this attention, research has rarely projected the additional funding and forces that could be generated if all NATO countries met the 2 percent of GDP benchmark—or a higher target.

Peaceful Resolution: Reframing U.S. Defense Strategy Toward Taiwan

Relook Playbook: Defense Budgeting Insights From a CSBA Rebalancing Exercise

The Lost Art of the Bargaining Chip? The Case for Gaining Negotiating Leverage for Nuclear Arms Control With Russia and China

Focused Force: China’s Military Challenge and Australia’s Response

Putting It All Together: The 2025 Defense Budget Request, Alternative Budget Proposals, and NATO Spending

More of the Same? The Future of the Russian Military And Its Ability to Change

Strengthening the Phalanx: Layered, Comprehensive, and Distributed Air and Missile Defense in the Indo-Pacific

Inconsistent Congress: Analysis of the 2024 Defense Budget Request

Evaluate Like We Operate: Why DOD Should Evaluate Weapons Systems as Networked Force Packages, Not Individual Platforms

Extending Deterrence by Detection: The Case for Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems Into the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness

Beyond Precision: Maintaining America’s Strike Advantage in Great Power Conflict

The Decisive Decade: United States–China Competition in Defense Innovation and Defense Industrial Policy in and Beyond the 2020s

Featured Event

Report Release Webinar: Strengthening the Phalanx: Layered, Comprehensive, and Distributed Air and Missile Defense in the Indo-Pacific

Four Think Tanks, One Defense Budget

Cut Carriers To Save Subs, Cyber From Sequester, Thinktanks Say

Cuts in U.S. Defense Spending Force Hard Strategic Choices

Think Tanks Project Force Structure, Strategy Under Continued Sequestration

Platform, Personnel Cuts Likely in FY ‘15 Air Force Budget

Panel Recommends Reducing Active-Duty Air Force

Latest Publications

To Preserve Extended Nuclear Deterrence in Europe an American Should be SACEUR

Peaceful Resolution: Reframing U.S. Defense Strategy Toward Taiwan

Relook Playbook: Defense Budgeting Insights From a CSBA Rebalancing Exercise

The Lost Art of the Bargaining Chip? The Case for Gaining Negotiating Leverage for Nuclear Arms Control With Russia and China

Focused Force: China’s Military Challenge and Australia’s Response

Putting It All Together: The 2025 Defense Budget Request, Alternative Budget Proposals, and NATO Spending