CSBA

Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments

Shaping America's Future Military

Thinking about DoD's next force planning construct

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Project Objectives

- **Assess force planning constructs adopted by DoD over the last 20 years**
  - What has worked, what didn't, and why
- **Inform development of the next construct**
  - Guiding principles
  - What could help it to have a real impact in period of transition

1

What is a Force Planning Construct?

- **Guidance on the size (capacity) and shape (mix of capabilities) of U.S. military forces needed for a range of future scenarios**
  - Includes assumptions on the nature of the operating environment, frequency and concurrency of operations, steady-state and surge capability requirements, mobilization policies, deployed / dwell force ratios, etc.

Addresses supply and demand for capabilities

- **Has become a major Quadrennial Defense Review output**
  - Part of the strategic narrative to rationalize defense budget requests
  - Signals significant shifts in defense policy and planning priorities

A key link between the Defense Strategic Guidance and DoD's capability and resource priorities

2


CSBA
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments
Assessing Post-Cold War FPCs
Homeland Defense
War on Terror
Irregular Warfare
Conventional Campaign(s)
Catastrophic Challenges
Disruptive Challenges
Prevent Acquisition Or Use of WMD
Defend Homeland in Depth
Shape Choices Of
Quadrennial Defense Review Report
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CSBA 1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR)
Force Structure Building-Block Approach



- **Assumed a force properly sized for 2 major regional contingencies (MRCs) could also meet the demand for smaller conventional operations ("lesser included cases")**

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CSBA 1993 BUR Construct (cont.)



- In the event of 1 MRC, reduce regional presence and discontinue elective humanitarian, disaster relief, democracy operations;
- For 2 MRCs, discontinue peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, further reduce regional presence

- Capability enhancements needed to support force cuts and enable a 2 MRC construct:
  - Strategic lift, prepositioning
  - PGMs, especially anti-armor munitions, and ISR for targeting

Army	10 divisions (active) 5+ divisions (reserve)
Navy	11 aircraft carriers (active) 1 aircraft carrier (reserve/training) 45-55 attack submarines 346 ships
Air Force	13 fighter wings (active) 7 fighter wings (reserve) Up to 184 bombers (B-52H, B-1, B-2)
Marine Corps	3 Marine Expeditionary Forces 174,000 personnel (active end-strength) 42,000 personnel (reserve end-strength)
Strategic Nuclear Forces (by 2003)	18 ballistic missile submarines Up to 94 B-52H bombers 20 B-2 bombers 500 Minuteman III ICBMs (single warhead)

by 1999 5

CSBA 1997 QDR Construct "BUR-Light"



Major QDR Objectives

- Preserve the BUR force planning approach
- Create a rationale for additional force cuts
- Continue capability enhancements, e.g., improved surveillance and precision strike
- Address requirements to support multiple, concurrent SSCs

Most significant cuts

	FY1997 Programmed Force	1997 QDR
Active Personnel	1,450,000	1,360,000
Reserve Personnel	900,000	835,000
Civilian Personnel	800,000	640,000

		FY1997 Programmed Force	1997 QDR
Army	Active Divisions	10	10
	Reserve Personnel	582,000	530,000
Navy	Aircraft Carriers (Active/Reserve)	11/1	11/1
	Air Wings (Active/Reserve)	10/1	10/1
	Amphibious Ready Groups	12	12
	Attack Submarines	73	50
	Surface Combatants	128	116
Air Force	Active Fighter Wings	13	12+
	Reserve Fighter Wings	7	8
	Reserve Air Defense Squadrons	10	4
	Bombers (Total)	202	187
Marine Corps	Marine Expeditionary Forces	3	3

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CSBA 2001 QDR Construct "1-4-2-1"

Major Objectives

- Size for homeland defense, forward defense, and SSCs
- Adopt a different concept: forward deterrence to ***prevent*** conflicts, rather than respond to crises
- Shift from optimizing for NEA and SWA conflicts to a broader range of scenarios
- Accept risk in the second of 2 major wars

"Deterring aggression and coercion by deploying forward the capacity to swiftly defeat attacks and impose severe penalties for aggression"

	Major Forces (AC/RC)	
USA	Divisions	10/8
	Cavalry Regiments	1/1
	Enhanced Separate Brigades	15
USN	Aircraft carriers	12
	Air Wings	10/1
	Amphib Ready Groups	12
	Attack Submarines	55
	Surface Combatants	108/8
USAF	Fighter Squadrons	46/38
	Air Defense Squadrons	/4
	Bombers (combat-coded)	112
USMC (3 MEFs)	Divisions	3/1
	Air Wings	3/1
	Force Service Support Groups	3/1

1-4-2-1

1. Defend the United States;
4. Deter aggression and coercion forward in critical regions;
2. Swiftly defeat aggression in overlapping major conflicts while preserving for the President the option to call for a decisive victory in one of those conflicts – including the possibility of regime change or occupation; and
1. Conduct a limited number of smaller-scale contingency operations

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CSBA 2006 QDR "Refined Wartime Force Planning Construct"

Major Objectives

- Prioritize capabilities needed for the QDR's four "focus areas"
- Address requirements for COIN, CT, irregular warfare, stability ops
- Incorporate the indirect approach (build partner capacity)
- Address imbalance between short- and long-range surveillance and strike capabilities

Change the Capabilities Mix, Forces Sized About Right



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CSBA 2006 QDR "Michelin Man" Broader Range of Contingencies





STEADY-STATE / SURGE CAPACITY

Steady State
- Global Deterrence, defense in depth
- Continuously enabling partnership capacity

Surge (45 days)
- 3 major consequence management events
- Increase air/maritime defense and interdiction

Steady State
- Global CT / COIN / HUMINT
- One medium-scale stability op OR up to ten small-scale operations

Surge (multi-year)
- One large-scale stability operation OR four medium-scale stability operations

Steady State
- Global deterrence
- Regional deterrence in multiple regions

Surge (120 days?)
- One large-scale ground-intensive campaign OR one large-scale air and maritime campaign

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2010 QDR
"No Name" Construct



- Guidance for sizing as well as shaping the force
- Multiple scenario "cases" for near-term (next 5-7 years) and long-term (years 7-20) planning
- Preserved 2 war planning requirement, prioritized capabilities that can rapidly "swing" between theaters
- Maintain ability to project power in A2/AD environments

Illustrative Case
Theater #1 – Combined arms campaign in all domains to defeat acts of aggression + **Theater #2** – Deny the objectives of / impose unacceptable costs on an opportunistic aggressor in 2nd region + **Homeland Defense** – Defend the homeland and provide support to civil authorities during consequence management events

Illustrative Case
Theater #1 – Large-scale air and naval campaign against an aggressor + **Theater #2** – Immediately followed by major campaign in different theater + **Homeland Defense** – Large-scale homeland defense consequence management event + – Support steady-state operations

Note: The kinds and combinations of possible scenarios that could be used to assess future capabilities are derived from DoD publications and official testimony.

CSBA 2011-2012 Comprehensive Strategic Review Update



- 1 conventional combined arms campaign + deter, spoil acts of aggression in a 2nd theater
- Asia-Pacific rebalancing
- No longer size the force for large-scale, long-duration stability operations
- Signaled another reduction in nuclear forces is possible

CSBA 20 Years of FPCs… But Have They Driven Change?

- **Many elements of the force still resemble the 1993 Bottom-Up Review force structure**
  - Albeit generally smaller, and with exceptions (such as SOF)

	1993 Bottom-Up Review	2010 QDR and Nuclear Posture Review
ARMY	10 divisions (active) 5+ divisions (reserve)	10 divisions (active)* 3 divisions (reserve), 2 divisions (integrated)* (45 active brigade combat teams, 28 reserve brigade combat teams, 21 combat aviation brigades)
NAVY	11 aircraft carriers (active) 1 aircraft carrier (reserve) 45-55 attack submarines 346 ships	11 aircraft carriers 10 carrier air wings 53-55 attack subs, 4 guided missile subs 288 total active ships**
AIR FORCE	13 fighter wings (active) 7 fighter wings (reserve) Up to 184 bombers (B-52, B-1, B-2)	10-11 theater strike wing-equivalents 6 air superiority wing-equivalents 5 bomber wings (162 total B-52, B-1, B-2)
USMC	3 Marine Expeditionary Forces	3 Marine Expeditionary Forces
NUCLEAR FORCES	18 ballistic missile submarines Up to 94 B-52H, 20 B-2 bombers 500 Minuteman III (single warhead)	14 ballistic missile submarines 76 B-52s (convert some to conv. only), 18 B-2s 450 Minuteman III (single warhead)

* in 2010 ** as of 30 Sep 2010

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
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Multiple FPC Iterations, Remarkably Static Budget Shares
1993 BUR
Today
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
Service Shares of the Base Defense Budget
Air Force
Navy & Marine Corps
Army
Defense-Wide
FY92
FY93
FY94
FY95
FY96
FY97
FY98
FY99
FY00
FY01
FY02
FY03
FY04
FY05
FY06
FY07
FY08
FY09
FY10
FY11
FY12
FY13
FY14
Does not include funding for overseas contingency operations
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CSBA *May Have Had the Most Impact When New Requirements Were Additive*

	1993 BUR	1997 QDR	2001 QDR	2006 QDR	2010 QDR	2012 Strategic Review
Force Planning Construct	2 Major Regional Conflicts	2 Major Theater Wars	1 – 4 – 2 – 1	Refined Wartime Construct; the "Michelin Man"	No Name	No Name
Major Elements	Defeat 2 Regional Threats Nearly Simultaneously	Defeat Large-Scale Cross-Border Aggression in 2 Theaters in Overlapping Timeframes + Smaller-Scale Contingencies	Homeland Defense + 2 Swiftly Defeats (Win 1 Decisively)	Homeland Defense + 2 Conventional Contingencies or 1 Conventional + 1 Irregular Warfare Contingencies	Homeland Consequence Management Events + 2 Large-Scale Land Campaigns or 1 Large Air/Naval Campaign + Campaign in 2nd Theater or 1 Large Land Campaign + Long-Term IW Campaign	Homeland Defense, Provide Support to Civil Authorities + 1 Full Combined Arms Campaign Across All Domains + Deny Objectives or Impose Unacceptable Costs on 2nd Opportunistic Aggressor
Focus	Size for 2 MRCs, other contingencies are lesser included cases	Size for 2 MTWs plus steady-state SSCs; swing some forces to 2nd major conflict	Emphasize forward defense; focus on four priority theaters; accept risk in a 2nd major conflict	Shift capabilities to address 4 focus areas; long-duration irregular warfare; address steady-state and surge demand	Size as well as shape; multiple scenario cases for the near- and far-term; address surge and steady-state demand, including long-term irregular warfare	Do not size the force for large and protracted stability operations; rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region; reversibility
Context	Gulf War, demand for a peace dividend	Bosnia, peace dividend	Transform the force, support War on Terror	Long War, change capabilities mix, force is sized about right	Support for overseas contingency operations, defense budget cuts	Post-war budget and force structure cuts, prepare for future challenges

Why So Few Changes?

Institutional reasons

- **Desire to preserve the defense program of record**
- **Reluctance to address controversial roles and missions issues**

An analytical focus on the last war

CSBA A Chokepoint for DoD's Planning

- **Planning to defeat two large-scale, conventional cross-border invasions**
  - Defeating enemy forces, seizing territory, possibly culminating in regime changes and occupation
- **Persistence of optimistic planning assumptions**
  - Major APODs and SPODs available to support deployments of forces with large theater footprints
  - Early access to secure, close-in theater bases and air refueling
  - Permissive air, maritime, space, cyberspace operating domains

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CSBA Drivers when the Most Significant Changes Have Occurred?

Real-world operational needs

Major shifts in the security environment

Pressures on the defense budget

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CSBA Operational Demands and Changing Security Environments

Early 1990s: End of Cold War >> shift to conventional theater contingency scenarios

2001: 9/11 >> address homeland defense requirements

2002-2013: Iraq, Afghanistan >> major expansion of SOF, CT, unmanned aircraft, building partner capacity, etc.

Today

- **End of 12 years of war >> no large-scale stability ops**
- **Pacific rebalancing, A2/AD challenges >> not yet clear if they will lead to significant changes**

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CSBA Recent Muscle Movements

APR 2009	**$330B shift**	**Cuts** – About 20 "troubled or excess programs" including the Next Generation Bomber – 33,000 contractors	**Adds** + OCO-related enabling capabilities (unmanned aircraft, rotary wing, etc.)
AUG 2010	**-$100B** (over 5 years)	**Directed efficiencies** – Closed U.S. Joint Forces Command, ASD/NII office, Business Transformation Agency	– Headquarter staffs – Senior officers – Other efficiencies
FEB 2011	**FY12 budget**	**Cuts** – Overhead (efficiencies) – 27,000 Army and 15-20,000 USMC end strength (post surge cuts) – JSF production	**Adds** + Long Range Strike-Bomber + Unmanned aircraft + Cyber + Missile defense
FEB 2012	**FY13 budget -$487B** (over 10 years)	**Cuts** – $60 billion efficiencies – 72,000 Army and 20,000 USMC end strength – 17 Navy ships	– 10% Air Force fighter squadrons – Global Hawk Block 30

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CSBA *The Next QDR is an Opportunity*

- ☑ At the end of major overseas operations
- ☑ Changes in the security environment
- ☑ Possibility of a trillion dollar cumulative budget cut

One additional factor: "orphan" capabilities that are now more important than ever before

Long-range surveillance and strike, UAS, undersea warfare, SOF, cyber, DE, railguns, other leap-ahead technologies

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Toward A New Approach

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Candidate Guiding Principles for Developing the Next FPC

Establish priorities across DoD's "primary mission areas"

2010 QDR	*2012 DSG*
Succeed in Counterinsurgency, Stability, and Counterterrorism Ops	Counter Terrorism and Irregular Warfare
Deter and Defeat Aggression in Anti-Access Environments	Deter and Defeat Aggression
	Project Power Despite A2/AD Challenges
Prevent Proliferation and Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction	Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction
Operate Effectively in Cyberspace	Operate Effectively in Cyberspace and Space
	Maintain a Safe, Secure, and Effective Nuclear Deterrent
Defend the United States and Support Civil Authorities at Home	Defend the Homeland, Provide Support to Civil Authorities
	Provide a Stabilizing Presence
	Conduct Stability and Counterinsurgency Operations
	Conduct Humanitarian, Disaster Relief, & Other Operations
Build the Security Capacity of Partner States	

If everything is a priority, nothing is

QDR should define where DoD should reduce risk, maintain current level of risk, or accept increased risk

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Guiding Principles

Establish priorities across DoD's "primary mission areas"

2010 QDR	*2012 DSG*
Succeed in Counterinsurgency, Stability, and Counterterrorism Ops	Counter Terrorism and Irregular Warfare
Deter and Defeat Aggression in Anti-Access Environments	Deter and Defeat Aggression
	Project Power Despite A2/AD Challenges
Prevent Proliferation and Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction	Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction
Operate Effectively in Cyberspace	Operate Effectively in Cyberspace and Space
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Defend the United States and Support Civil Authorities at Home	Defend the Homeland, Provide Support to Civil Authorities
	Provide a Stabilizing Presence
	Conduct Stability and Counterinsurgency Operations
	Conduct Humanitarian, Disaster Relief, & Other Operations
Build the Security Capacity of Partner States	

If everything is a priority, nothing is

QDR should define where DoD should reduce risk, maintain current level of risk, or accept increased risk

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Guiding Principles (2)

Focus on shaping first

- **Understand *what* might be needed in the future before defining *how much***
  - Overall size of the force is more a function of available resources
- **Place priority on capabilities that:**
  - Will increase versatility and adaptability of the force, support a broad range of missions in permissive and non-permissive environments
  - Are theater non-specific, can rapidly "swing" across theaters (global surveillance and strike, mobility, some SOF, cyber, space, etc.)
  - May take longer to reconstitute

Maintain capabilities and capacity to deny multiple aggressors their objectives

- **This does not mean planning for two Desert Storm-like wars, nor does it mean that every Service must focus their planning on the same contingencies**
- **DoD, not every Service, should maintain "full-spectrum" capability**

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CSBA Adopt Realistic Scenarios & Assumptions for the Post-Invasion Era

Legacy	Looking Forward
Planning scenarios • Focused on defeating major cross-border invasions • Decisive conventional operations culminating in occupations / regime changes	**Planning scenarios** • Coercive threats, conflicts over maritime areas, loose nukes, hybrid wars, proxy conflicts • Prevent highly capable enemies from achieving their objections
Planning assumptions • Small number of forward MOBs, forces concentrated • APODs & SPODs available • U.S. forces can mass close to an enemy's borders • Permissive operating domains	**Planning assumptions** • Forward presence and deploying forces increasingly dispersed • Large APODs & SPODs at risk • U.S. forces operate from access-insensitive areas • Global commons contested

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
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Will Drive New Operational Concepts and a Different Capabilities Mix
Future Pacific?
Future Gulf?
22x greater than Iraq's landmass
Taiwan Strait
Denied Areas
Denied Areas
1,500 nm
1,000 nm
Andersen AFB
Sea Base
2,400 nm
Northern RAAF Bases
UK Bases
Aviano AB
2,355 nm
1,850 nm
Tehran
Denied Areas
2,200 nm
Diego Garcia
Potential target sets much greater in size, more time-sensitive, more mobile, better concealed, better hardened, deeply buried
Key Considerations:
• Depth of the battlespace
• APODs and SPODs at risk
• ESGs and CSGs may not be able to close on an enemy early in a conflict
• Average range to possible target areas > 1,200 nm
• Campaigns may be protracted
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CSBA *Jointly Create New Service Strategic Concepts Hand-in-Hand with the Next FPC*

"The fundamental element of a military service is its purpose or role in implementing military policy … the strategic concept of the service…a description of how, when, and where the military service expects to protect the nation against some threat to its security."

"Changes in the principal threats to the security of any given nation … must be met by shifts in national policy and corresponding changes in service strategic concepts"

— Dr. Samuel P. Huntington, 1954



Today, none of the Services have a clearly articulated strategic concept for the future

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CSBA Service Strategic Concepts

- **Clearly outline what Service force providers uniquely or predominately provide to combatant commanders**
  - Address future operational requirements for which each Service is best aligned
- **Explain how a Service plans to support other Services and what they expect from other Services**
- **Could help resolve roles and missions issues across and within the Services (such as Active/Reserve Component issues)**

Then align resources with new strategic concepts

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Navy: Sustaining our Nation's Offensive Punch from the Sea

- **Improve the ability of aircraft carriers to project power ashore and into contested areas**
- **Take advantage of undersea capabilities that can operate in denied areas**
- **Create cost/exchange ratios that favor the United States**
- **Prepare for operations that may be of long duration**

Getting the future carrier air wing right

Harnessing the potential of cyber & DE

Expanding payloads of the submarine fleet

Developing the right PGM magazine

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CSBA — Air Force: Creating an Effective Density of Surveillance & Strike Capabilities at Range

- **Develop a force mix capable of attacking the full range of targets in contested environments**
  - Focus resources on preparing for potential Asia-Pacific ops
- **America's "swing force" that can rapidly deploy to a 2nd theater to deter or spoil opportunistic acts of aggression**
- **Take full advantage of new technologies (unmanned, DE, other) to maintain freedom of action in the air, space, and EM domains**

Balancing mix of short-and long-range

Creating resilient forward postures

Fully harnessing the robotic revolution

Dominating the EM spectrum

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- **Creating a future force that is more capable of operations in contested areas and in the Asia-Pacific region**
- **This would drive a future force mix that is less dependent on secure, close-in bases**
- **The Air Force is just beginning to tap the potential of unmanned capabilities**
- **Today, its unmanned systems are mostly unsuitable for ops over long ranges and in contested areas**
- **Potential of new directed energy weapons, including HPM, that really are cost-imposing**


CSBA
Harnessing the Power of Combinations
Space Assets
More Dispersed, Resilient Basing Posture
Air-Breathing, Long-Endurance Communications Relays
Aerial Refueling
Standoff Strike Platforms
Undersea Land-Attack Capacity
Penetrating Munitions
Standoff Strike Platforms
Electronic Warfare Expendables
Penetrating Bombers
Next Generation Jammers
Carriers with Longer Range Air Wing Capabilities
Penetrating, Carrier-based Multi-Mission UAV
Enemy ASuW Threat
Enemy ASuW Threat
ASuW Threat
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Army: Preparing for the Post-Invasion Era

- New approaches and capabilities for imposing costs in the Pacific and Persian Gulf
- Prepare for hybrid and counter-WMD operations
- Land-based sea control

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Marine Corps: Leveraging Expeditionary Capabilities

- **Focus on rapid crisis responses**
  - Not a second land army
- **Distributed operations in the Pacific and Middle East**
  - Work with allies and partners to establish forward expeditionary operating locations
- **Joint theater entry operations**

Right-sizing expeditionary lift

Modernizing the STOVL force

Supporting capabilities for distributed ops

Fielding next generation EW capabilities

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Wrap-Up: One Approach to Focusing the Services' Unique Capabilities



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Questions?
Catastrophic Challenges
Prevent Acquisition Or Use of WMD
Defend Homeland in Depth
Shape Choices Of Countries at Strategic Crossroads
Disruptive Challenges
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