




CSBA

Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments

DEPLOYING BEYOND THEIR MEANS AMERICA'S NAVY AND MARINE CORPS AT A TIPPING POINT


BRYAN CLARK
JESSE SLOMAN

Global navies accompany global interests




Dutch, Spanish, and British had worldwide reach, combat credibility, access, and ability to maintain multiple “hubs”

U.S. Navy forward deployed since WW II



Forward presence more difficult to sustain with shrinking fleet and costlier personnel & maintenance

Is the Navy nearing a “tipping point?”




A shrinking fleet sustaining 100 deployed ships since 1998



Marine Corps deployed at its limit today

USMC Active Force Structure FY16

Infantry Battalions	24
Artillery Battalions	9
Tank Battalions	2
Combat Engineering Battalions	2
MARSOC Raider Battalions	3



Assumes current OPTEMPO and budget levels above BCA caps



High OPTEMPO affecting readiness & morale

Home / News / Navy

USS Essex unable to fulfill mission for 2nd time in seven months

By Matthew M. Burke
Stars and Stripes
Published: February 1, 2012

SASEBO NAVAL BASE, Japan — For the second time in seven months, mechanical or maintenance issues have prevented the USS Essex from meeting a commitment at sea, Navy officials said Wednesday.

The 21-year-old flagship of the forward deployed Expeditionary Strike Group 7 was scheduled to depart several days ago for Cobra Gold 2012, an annual exercise with Thailand. The mission was scrapped due to an equipment failure.



Home / News

Report: Maintenance of overseas-ported ships growing problem for Navy

By Wyatt Olson
Stars and Stripes
Published: May 30, 2015


Reports of degraded on U.S. Navy ships 1 years, with the cond homeported ships d based in the U.S.

Maintenance for son repeatedly delayed, according to a repor Government Accour worse, the Navy has plan to deal with ne

Ship crews face litany of maintenance problems

Sep. 21, 2014 - 06:00AM | 0 Comments

Recommend 2



VIRGINIA BEACH, VA. — The atmosphere was one of frustration shrouded in uncertainties as 1,100 Navy and industry leaders discussed ways to provide maintenance and modernization to a surface fleet burdened by growing demand and diminishing funds.

The Fleet Maintenance & Modernization

Congress Considers the Carrier 'Gap'

By Christopher P. Cavas 8:22 p.m. EST November 3, 2015

120 TWEET 42 LINKEDIN 4 COMMENT

WASHINGTON — There is no US carrier o the Middle East, a situation that is t of several years of high-tempo oper need to catch up on major maintena sustain that pace. Carriers have been entral Command's operating area be time was in 2007 — but this particul en more so as the Navy has warned fic operating area.


ommitment to field two carrier strike o oy should the need arise. Even if unding is restored, service leaders h would be able to regain those opera

amine both the US ability to deter c

31st Assessing the Fleet: The 2014 Navy Retention Study


AUGUST 2014
By CDR Guy Snodgrass

On March 7, 2014, a self-directed study was emailed to Vice Admiral Bill Moran, the U.S. Navy's Chief of Naval Personnel. Titled "[Keep a Weather Eye on the Horizon: A Navy Officer Retention Study](#)", the paper provided Vice Admiral Moran with a canary in the coal mine, describing a looming retention downturn using historical data and, perhaps most importantly, timely and relevant information based on primary source interviews with hundreds of U.S. Navy Sailors.



Gen. Paxton: Some Marine Units Operating at Less Than 1:2 Deployment-to-Dwell Ratio


By: Megan Eckstein
March 27, 2015 9:17 AM



U.S. Marines with Special-Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force Crisis Response-Africa board an MV-22 Osprey during an alert force drill on Moron Air Base, Spain, March 13, 2015. US Marine Corps photo.

WASHINGTON, D.C. — As much as the Marine Corps wants to increase its deployment-to-dwell ratio from the current 1:2 to the more sustainable 1:3, Assistant Commandant of the


Options to sustain overseas naval presence



More shipbuilding a long-term answer, but forward basing could be expanded in near-term

Naval forces rotationally train and maintain


Marine Corps Force Generation Process (Variable Length)




Carriers / Surface Craft: Optimized Fleet Response Plan (36 mos)




Submarines (24 months)



Forward Deployed CG/DDG (12 months)



Amphibious Ships (27 months)




...but the Navy has been unable to execute its plans



Will the Navy be able to grow the fleet?

	Navy Plan			\$13 Billion Alternative			\$11.5 Billion Alternative			\$10 Billion Alternative		
	2020	2030	2040	2020	2030	2040	2020	2030	2040	2020	2030	2040
Carriers	11	11	10	11	11	10	11	11	10	11	11	9
Large Surface Combatants	95	95	85	95	85	59	95	82	56	95	80	50
Attack Submarines	51	42	47	51	37	33	51	35	31	51	32	28
Amphibious Ships	33	36	33	33	36	31	33	36	28	33	33	24
Small Surface Combatants	33	52	56	33	27	28	33	25	23	32	23	20
Total Battle Force	304	312	302	304	274	224	304	267	210	303	257	191

New Ship Construction Costs



Navy's plan will require \$5-7B more than historical budget

Today's presence unsustainable






7th Fleet	
CVN	1.0
CG/DDG	12.0
SSN/GN	8.0
Amphib	5.0
SSC	5.3
CLF	9.0

6th Fleet	
CG/DDG	4.0
SSN/GN	3
Amphib	0.5
CLF	2.0

5th Fleet	
CVN	1.0
CG/DDG	8.0
SSN/GN	2.0
Amphib	3.0
SSC	14.0
CLF	5.0
ESD/ESB	1/1


4th Fleet	
CG/DDG	1.0
SSN/GN	0.0
Amphib	0.5
SSC	2.0
CLF	1.0

NAVAF	
CG/DDG	1
SSN/GN	0.5
Amphib	1.0
SSC	2.5
CLF	1.0



Presence levels are for *operating* presence, so forward-based ships provide 0.67 operating presence; this allows an "apples to apples" comparison between theaters and between forward basing and rotational deployment


- Current Plan
- \$13 Billion Plan
- \$11.5 Billion Plan
- \$10 Billion Plan



What historical funding can deliver


7th Fleet

CVN	0.7
CG/DDG	7.3
SSN/GN	2.7
Amphib	2.7
SSC	5.3
CLF	9.0




6th Fleet

CG/DDG	2.7
SSN/GN	3.0
Amphib	0.5
CLF	2.0




5th Fleet

CVN	1.0
CG/DDG	8.0
SSN/GN	2.0
Amphib	3.0
SSC	6.0
CLF	5.0
ESD/ESB	1/1








4th Fleet

CG/DDG	1.0
SSN/GN	0.0
Amphib	0.5
SSC	2.0
CLF	1.0



NAVAF

CG/DDG	1
SSN/GN	0.5
Amphib	1.0
SSC	2.5
CLF	1.0




- Current Plan
- \$13 Billion Plan
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- \$10 Billion Plan

May need more Europe presence

7th Fleet


CVN	1.0
CG/DDG	12.0
SSN/GN	8.0
Amphib	5.0
SSC	5.3
CLF	9.0

Create a 3rd hub in 6th fleet




6th Fleet

CVN	1.0
CG/DDG	5.0
SSN/GN	3
Amphib	0.5
CLF	2.0




5th Fleet

CVN	1.0
CG/DDG	8.0
SSN/GN	2.0
Amphib	3.0
SSC	14.0
CLF	5.0
ESD/ESB	1/1




4th Fleet

CG/DDG	0.0
SSN/GN	0.0
Amphib	0.5
SSC	2.0
CLF	1.0




NAVAF


CG/DDG	1.0
SSN/GN	0.5
Amphib	1.0
SSC	2.5
CLF	1.0




CVN




CG/DDG




SSN



Amphibs




Small Surface Combatant



- Current Plan
- \$13 Billion Plan
- \$11.5 Billion Plan
- \$10 Billion Plan

Mitigating shortfalls with forward basing



Changes in forward basing between 2000 and 2024

*PCs not part of battle force ship count
 ** Reduction due to adoption of O-FRP
 *** LCS technically not in FDNF; crews rotate to ship

May not be a viable future approach due to cost of readiness model, impact on surge, and need for infrastructure

2nd FDNF CVN enables third hub

7th Fleet	
CVN	1.4
CG/DDG	12.0
SSN/GN	8.0
Amphib	5.0
SSC	5.0
CLF	9.0

Carrier and 1 CG/DDG added to 6th Fleet







6th Fleet	
CVN	0.8
CG/DDG	5.0
SSN/GN	3
Amphib	0.5
CLF	2.0

1 CVN added to 7th Fleet FDNF creates overlapping presence

5th Fleet	
CVN	1.0
CG/DDG	8.0
SSN/GN	2.0
Amphib	3.0
SSC	14.0
CLF	5.0
ESD/ESB	1/1

4th Fleet	
CG/DDG	0.0
SSN/GN	0.0
Amphib	0.5
SSC	2.0
CLF	1.0


NAVAF	
CG/DDG	1.0
SSN/GN	0.5
Amphib	1.0
SSC	2.5
CLF	1.0



— Current Plan
— \$13 Billion Plan
— \$11.5 Billion Plan
— \$10 Billion Plan

Supporting EUCOM SPMAGTF


7th Fleet	
CVN	1.0
CG/DDG	12.0
SSN/GN	8.0
Amphib	4.7
SSC	5.3
CLF	9.0




1 ARG added to 7th Fleet FDNF eliminates the need for a rotation of U.S.-based amphibs

6th Fleet amphib presence can go up by 1


6th Fleet	
CG/DDG	4.0
SSN/GN	3
Amphib	1.5
CLF	2.0









5th Fleet	
CVN	1.0
CG/DDG	8.0
SSN/GN	2.0
Amphib	3.0
SSC	14.0
CLF	5.0
ESB/ESD	1/1



4th Fleet	
CG/DDG	1.0
SSN/GN	0.0
Amphib	0.5
SSC	2.0
CLF	1.0



NAVAF	
CG/DDG	1
SSN/GN	0.5
Amphib	1.0
SSC	2.5
CLF	1.0



- Current Plan
- \$13 Billion Plan
- \$11.5 Billion Plan
- \$10 Billion Plan

Conclusions

- The Navy / Marine Corps are maximizing forward presence
 - At or exceeding planned deployment lengths & frequency
 - Service chiefs acknowledge surge capacity at 1/3 normal
- Today's optempo is wearing out the fleet faster, e.g.
 - Shortfall of strike fighters due to wearing out faster
 - Carrier gap in 5th fleet due to unexpected maintenance
- The planned fleet cannot maintain today's presence
 - And keep to established readiness cycles
- DoD must reduce its overseas presence or implement a mix of:
 - More shipbuilding
 - Expanded forward basing
 - Readiness cycles with more deployed time