

Advancing Beyond the Beach: Amphibious Operations in an Era of Precision Weapons




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
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Study methodology



Contested areas make “rollback” challenging

NOTE: Range arcs are illustrative of possible threats rather than an actual force laydown.




New deterrence approaches needed

- **Today's force designed to deter by compellence after the fact**
 - Adversary commits aggression; U.S. surges forces to reverse gains
 - Requires months of force flow before “roll back” begins
 - E.g., Iraq (X2); notional plans for DPRK and Iran
- **Threatening a response after aggression is no longer effective**
 - China, Russia, and Iran can rapidly achieve likely objectives
 - Anti-access capabilities preclude traditional build-up
- **Future deterrence approach should include two elements:**
 - Deny or delay aggression: With survivable, forward postured forces
 - Punishment: Impose costs *immediately* to compel aggression to stop

Future deployed forces need to focus on deterrence through denial and punishment of an adversary's aggression


Iranian ASCMs can threaten entire Gulf



Iranian Ground-Launched Anti-Ship Missile Systems				
System Family	System Designation	Export Designation	IOC	Range (nm)
		C-701	1990s	13.5
Kosar	Kosar-1		2004	8.1
Kosar	Kosar-3		2009	13.5
Kosar	Zafar		2012	13.5
Nasr	Nasr-1	TL-2/FL-6	2010	18.9
Karus			1996	21.6
		C-802	1993	64.8
Tondar			1998	64.8
Tondar	Noor		2002	97.2
Tondar	Qader/Ghader		2012	162.0
	Ra'ad/Saeqeh		2007	216.0


Source – IHS Jane's

Islands threaten air & surface across SCS



Chinese Ground-Launched Anti-Ship Missile Systems

System Family	System Designation	Export Designation	IOC	Range (nm)
HY-2	HY-2		1978	51
HY-2	HY-2	C-201	Late 1970s	51
	HY-4A	C-201	1999	110-150
	HY-3	C-301/Fl-3	1995	70
YJ-7	YJ-7	C-701	1989, 2004, 2010	13
YJ-7		C-704	2007	19
YJ-83		C-802 / C-802A	1993	65 / 97
	YJ-62	C-602	2004	151
	YJ-18		2014	292
P-270 Moski	3M82MBE	FF-1/JL-9	2000	135
DF-21	DF-21D		2011	837



New platforms designed to increase reach




- Operational Maneuver From the Sea for amphibious ops at long ranges
 - For Distributed Operations (DO)
 - To reduce threat from ASCMs
- Ship to Objective Maneuver
 - To reduce time of beach transition
 - Use vertical lift, new vehicle
- Major shortfalls
 - Not enough F-35Bs to support DO
 - One vehicle able to fit on MV-22

Surface connectors vulnerable or slow



- Surface connectors needed for mobility, fires
 - Armored HMMV or JLTV
 - HIMARS, M777
- Landing Craft (Air Cushioned) – LCAC
 - Large payload
 - Relatively fast (40 kts); 300 nm range
 - Identifiable; lacks self defense
- Landing Craft (Utility) - LCU
 - Larger payload than LCAC
 - Slow (10 kts); 1200 nm range
 - Could blend into coastal shipping

Fires need same reach as troops





New Concepts


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EABs can support a range of applications



Defend EABs by increasing req'd salvo size



**28 weapons required to exceed defensive capacity – for every target
Could result in hundreds of weapons needed to defeat a single EAB**

New air defenses increase defensive capacity



- Indirect Fires Protection Capability (IFPC)
 - Inc 2-1 w/ AIM-9X or Lower AD
 - Inc 3 with laser or HP RF weapons
- M777 w/ hypervelocity projectiles (HVP)
 - Requires Sentinel radar
 - Each can engage 1 weapon per salvo
- Defensive systems increase number of weapons required per target




Counter-ISR systems grow number of targets




- EABs can be harder to defeat than ships
 - Can exploit terrain and foliage
 - Have many discrete targets
 - Easier to harden and reconstitute
- Passive defenses can help defend EABs
 - Do not need to be perfect
 - Only need decoy system to look like camouflaged real system
 - Increases number of targets to engage

EABs supported organically or by host nation



1-2 MV-22 flights per day could support the EAB; with FARP, an additional MV-22 flight could resupply fuel bladder


Cross-domain fires create barrier to enemy




Blockade key to protracted conflict










Amphibious raids to defeat threats to access



Amphibious forces can support SUW



New amphibious posture to deny and punish



A light gray world map is centered on the page, overlaid on a white grid background. The map shows the continents of North America, South America, Europe, Africa, Asia, and Australia.

Capability Implications

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Lighter vehicles can increase range & firepower



- Marine vehicle weight has increased
 - IED threat in Iraq and Afghanistan
 - New vehicle acquisitions
- MV-22-compatible vehicles increase MAGTF's ability to project power at long-range
 - Internally Transportable Vehicle (ITV) and Expeditionary Fire Support System (EFSS)
- DARPA GXV-T program

Connectors optimized for ocean travel



- “EFV-like” system no longer useful
 - 25 nm prohibitively close
- Surface connectors should be optimized for ocean transit rather than to fight on land
 - Quicker transit times
 - Ground vehicles without amphibious design tradeoffs
- EPF and UHAC both provide speed/range to MAGTF

Missiles increase MAGTF's long-range fires




**Long-Range Precision Fires
(LRPF)**

- Distributed ops will require fire support over long ranges
 - RIMPAC 2014 warfighting experiment
- Missile launchers with multi-mode weapons
 - Reduce logistical challenges
 - Maximize limited magazine space
- Long-endurance UAVs provide organic over-the-horizon detection capability

Missiles can support distributed ops



Increase amphibious ship armament



- Current amphibious ships lack offensive and defensive capability
 - Cannot participate in Distributed Lethality
 - Require escort when air threat present
- LPD-17 hull has sufficient space to support VLS
- Long-endurance UAVs and NIFC-CA will improve the reach of VLS-equipped amphibious ships


Rebalance amphibious loadouts to aviation



- *America*-class Flight 0 ships add aviation capacity compared to LHDs
 - 40 percent more hangar space
 - Double cargo fuel payload
- Aviation-optimized LHAs will improve ARG's long-range striking power
 - 20+ F-35s linked via NIFC-CA to air and surface assets
- DoD should develop a CATOBAR variant to act as a light aircraft carrier (CVL)

Four-ship ARG increases capacity

ARG Storage Comparison (ft³ or ft²)



Four-ship ARG increases fires


Current ARG: 6x AV-8B, 12x MV-22, 3x UH-1, 4x AH-1, 4x CH-53



Four-Ship ARG Strike Optimized: 20x AV-8B/ F-35B, 4x MV-22, 3x UH-1, 4x AH-1, 4x CH-53




Four-Ship ARG Fast Assault Optimized: 10x AV-8B/ F-35B, 12x MV-22, 7x CH-53, 2 K-MAX



STOVL fighter mission inventory will increase


2016



84x AV-8B
(6 x VMA)

21x F-35B
(1 x VMFA)


2030s




194x F-35B
(14 x VMFA)

New readiness cycle will enable more presence

Current amphibious forces readiness cycle





Proposed amphibious force readiness cycle



Amphibious fleet should expand

Small Deck Amphibious Ships





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