



QDR and FY15 Budget Alternative

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*Disclaimer: CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed herein should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

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Strategic Focus

- Assumed continuation of Defense Strategic Guidance through the National Security Strategy and the 2014 QDR
 - Strong Asia Pacific priority, focused on engagement and presence
 - Focus on homeland defense mission, including Guard and Reserve forces
 - Illustrative reliance on partners and allies
 - Retain counterterrorism and Middle East capabilities
- Some budget cuts are unwise and don't support the strategy; they are NOT recommendations but are required by the dollar level.
- Maximized to the limits of the exercise the use of serious management reform as a way to save money.

Asia Pacific

Presence: Optimize U.S. access (refueling, logistics, basing, etc.) and increase forward stationing of ships

Undersea warfare: Additional SSNs (including allies), UUVs and undersea S&T, ASW capabilities (P-8, munitions, sensors)

Engagement: Logistics and communications BPC, USMC rotations, SOF Regional coordination, basing structure BPC

Complicate Chinese strategy and targeting with dispersal sites, towed payload modules, naval decoys, microsattelites, etc.

Increased Capability: anti-ship munitions (including land-based), standoff weapons, missile defense, unmanned ISR and strike assets, space-based systems

Illustrative reliance on partners and allies

SSBN:

- Rely on UK for some SSBN on-station requirement
- Ohio-class replacement program alternative

SSN:

- *Collins*-class alternative

FMS:

- Selling LCS and other advanced platforms to partners and allies



Ground Forces

Guiding principles and assumptions:

- No major land war without mobilization
- Modest tiering of readiness
- Rely on current inventory of platforms

Army:

- AC force structure moves to the RC in Move 1, then populated those units with personnel plus-ups across both FYDPs.
- RC plus-ups feed three mission requirements: homeland defense, mobilization base for MCO, rotation base for forward presence

Marine Corps: Prioritize maritime and expeditionary role

- Reduce to a 2 MEF structure
- Cut tank battalions, kept amphibious battalions
- Added 1 Marine SOF battalion, smaller units in Asia Pacific

Air

- Maintained most active AF force structure and platforms
 - Retired B-1s, KC-10s (global supply), U-2s, Active unit A-10s, some legacy aircraft,
 - Trimmed F-35A and F-35B buy, keep LRS-B in development
- Invested in long-legged unmanned ISR, including BAMS, Global Hawk, N-UCAS, UCLASS

Navy

- 8 Carriers and related strike group surface ships
- Fewer amphibs to match USMC cuts

Nuclear, Space, Cyber

Nuclear:

- Cut 1 ICBM wing
- Ohio-class replacement program alternative

Space:

- Protected SATCOM, SSA, S&T (Super-INS; Satellite Maneuverability, Refueling, and Defenses, Satellite Jammer)

Cyber:

- Invest in DoD cyber offense
- Focus cyber defense outside DoD

Technology Superiority

- Increase S&T investment
- 6th Generation Fighter

Buying Back Capability in the Half BCA

Ground Forces:

- Army: Rationalize force management of AC cuts (ramp to 405k Army in Move 1, 380k in move 2), with some readiness reductions
- USMC: Restore F-35B, reduce infantry and amphibs cut by half

Technology:

- Bought new tech earlier – space assets, unmanned, more S&T to allow procurement in Move 2

Modernization Impact:

- Slowing personnel cuts reduces ability to buy back other capabilities in the second FYDP (taking personnel cuts quickly frees up funds for modernization)