



# *Rebalancing America's Military for a New Era*

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- **US and allies will be tested by, and compete with, revisionist powers who seek to alter regional security balances**
  - Growing A2/AD capabilities
  - Developing regional power projection capabilities
  - Pursuing unconventional warfare, counter-space, and cyber warfare
- **WMD threats likely to grow over next 20 years (loss of control, terrorist use, and employment in battle)**
  - *Nuclear weapons*: other nuclear powers are modernizing forces, while some non-nuclear powers are contemplating the acquisition of nuclear weapons
  - *Biological weapons*: increasingly accessible to terrorists; danger of novel agents
  - *Chemical weapons*: Syria portends future risks of a central government's loss of positive control over its CW stocks; costly elimination nightmare
- **Irregular and hybrid warfare threats**
  - Non-state actors may mix sophisticated technologies with low-tech strategies to destabilize strategically important states, conduct protracted wars, or inflict catastrophic terrorist attacks

- **Must confront these challenges in the context of:**
  - **Fiscal backdrop: increasing resource constraints**
    - DoD's top line is coming down
    - Personnel costs are eating the Department from the inside
  - **Technological backdrop: falling barriers to entry in key areas**
    - Precision-guided weaponry
    - Supercomputing/big data
    - Robotics/autonomy
    - Cyber/electro-magnetic activities
    - Space access

***Bottom line: a range of challenges have the potential to shift regional security balances and erode the effectiveness of traditional forms of US military power projection***

- **Objectives:**

- Maintain access to and from those areas remain vital US interests
- Prevent the domination of key overseas regions by hostile powers
- Shore up US security commitments and regional security balances
- Prevent terrorist attacks

- **Approach:**

- Emphasize projecting power despite WMD or A2/AD threats while maintaining robust strategic deterrence and counterterrorism forces
- Prioritize capabilities and forces that can operate in non-permissive environments (access-insensitive, low-signature, highly distributed)
- Maximize combat strike power to impose costs on strategic competitors
- Adopt new divisions of labor with allies
- Align basing/access posture and logistics to better support new force

***Bottom line: Need to shift from longstanding “compellence force” to a future “global deterrence force”***

# From Compellence to Deterrence

- **Since 1945, the U.S. military has prioritized expeditionary “compellence forces” designed to evict aggressors post-invasion**
  - Heavy combined arms maneuver ground forces provide preponderance of landpower but require lots of time and access to build up in-theater
  - Air forces primarily short-ranged and depend on operating from close-in
  - High-signature naval and amphibious forces assume access close to shore
- **Compellence has implicit foundation in every force planning construct from the Bottom-Up Review to the most recent QDR**
- **But as Schelling noted, “it is easier to *deter* than to *compel*”**
  - Especially today, as military-technical advances are advantaging denial over control
  - The challenges to projecting traditional compellence power are growing, and our investments are being skewed toward defensive rather than offensive systems
- **In an era of constrained resources, we can best achieve our national security objectives by shifting from compellence to deterrence**
  - Deterrence is best achieved and maintained by the capability to punish aggressors and/or deny them their objectives

- **Retain nuclear triad**
  - Continue B61 life extension, LRSO development, dual capable F-35 modifications
- **Maximize joint force ability to conduct long-range strikes**
  - Expand undersea strike capacity with VPM, LDUUV, and towed payload modules
  - Free up surface combatants and VLS tubes for offensive weapons by fielding Aegis ashore, DE and rail guns for point defense, escort frigates
  - Expand land and carrier-based options to conduct long-range penetrating strikes
    - Accelerate long range strike bomber program, field land-based penetrating UCAS
    - Acquire UCLASS w/ sufficient payload, stealth, and endurance to operate from range into denied areas
- **Pursue new weapons and increased inventories**
  - Develop high-powered microwave; enhanced bunker busters; stealthy land-attack and anti-ship weapons, land-based and sea-based IRBMs
  - Acquire additional SDBs, LRASMs, JASSM-ERs, conventional LRSOs
  - Increase offensive cyber and test range capacity, as well as electronic attack capabilities
- **Protect planned SOF growth in order to preserve direct action and unconventional regime change options**
  - Increase capabilities for stealthy insertion/extraction and new weapons
  - Improve protected comms to link with other access-insensitive forces in denied areas

- **At sea**
  - Leverage and sustain undersea dominance (SSNs, payload modules, UUVs, sensors)
  - Develop new UUV torpedoes, mines
  - Invest in offensive mining capability for UUVs, aircraft, surface ships
  - Develop and deploy land-based and sea-launched anti-ship missiles
- **On the ground**
  - Develop new, forward stationed Army forces that can conduct land-based sea denial, air/missile defense, and deep strike
  - Provide for additional airbase hardening, aircraft shelters, rapid repair kits, and dispersal airbases in PACOM
- **In the air and space**
  - Field ground-based, sea-based, and airborne electronic warfare systems and decoys
  - Field co-orbital microsattellites and space situational awareness systems
  - Acquire additional Air-Launched Hit-To-Kill (ALHTK) interceptors, THAAD
  - Enable more distributed air operations within contested areas with F-35Bs
- **In cyberspace**
  - Invest in additional cyber defense capacity

- **Develop new divisions of labor with our allies**
  - Allies should assume greater responsibility as “first responders” for own defense and create “friendly” A2/AD to defend sovereignty and provide forward sanctuaries for US forces
  - US will police global commons and maximize combat strike power for deterrence within alliance frameworks
  
- **Align logistics to maximize combat power and time on station/patrol of relatively smaller force**
  - Invest in overseas submarine infrastructure and new submarine tenders
  - Expand Combat Logistics Fleet
  - Develop at-sea VLS re-arming capability



- **Compellence forces**

- Relinquish on-demand capacity for large-scale stability ops or simultaneous major combat ops
- Reduce AC Army to 22 BCTs (8A, 2S, 12I) and RC to 19 BCTs (3A, 1S, 15I)
- Divest Marines’ “second land army” capabilities and reserve combat units
- Divest USAF and USN legacy TACAIR

- **Near-term readiness**

- Sacrifice some near-term “readiness” to protect and enhance long-term readiness
- Keep readiness at level higher than previously recommended under full BCA

- **Visible presence**

- Focus on operations in contested environments drove investment into low-signature and over-the-horizon forces that don’t provide as visible presence, even if they are more combat capable

# Summary Chart

