



A Rebalanced Force for Assured Access

CSBA

Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments

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- Preventing the domination of key overseas regions by hostile powers while maintaining access to and from those areas remain vital US interests
- A range of challenges – WMD, A2/AD, irregular/hybrid, and cyber threats – have the potential to shift regional security balances and erode the effectiveness of traditional forms of US military power projection
- CSBA's strategic approach intended to shore up US security commitments and regional security balances, while deterring regional hegemonic aspirants
 - Emphasizes *projecting power despite WMD or A2/AD threats while maintaining robust strategic deterrence and counterterrorism forces*
 - Places *premium on capabilities and forces best able to operate in non-permissive environments overseas (access-insensitive, low-signature, highly distributed)*
 - Seeks optimal balance between *combat strike power, range, survivability, and sustainability*

- To ensure **strategy-driven approach**, maximized resource allocation to highest priority capabilities and forces before making cuts to lowest priority areas
- Traded current **capacities** for advanced **capabilities** best aligned with strategic approach to improve longer-term readiness (gave priority to force shaping over force sizing)
- Sought to protect near-term **readiness**, but could not do so at full BCA-level cuts

Full BCA: Rebalanced capabilities first, then focused on budget target

- Traded personnel, force structure and some readiness in first FYDP to modernize for future challenges


Half BCA: Accelerated and expanded capabilities rebalancing

- Bought back 100% readiness for both FYDPs

Prioritized New “Crown Jewels”

- *Cyber and electronic warfare*
- *Expanded undersea capacity*
- *Advanced unmanned, long-range penetrating air ISR & strike*
- *Protected space systems & post-GPS navigation*
- *Special Operations Forces*
- *Nuclear forces*


FULL BCA



FULL BCA

- Traded DoD TACAIR for long-range, multi-mission air systems
- Increased carrier air wing range and persistence
- Bought next generation precision munitions


- Added undersea capacity for standoff strikes
- Increased subs and UUVs, combat logistics ships, and MCM ships
- Developed DE and railguns as force multipliers



FULL BCA

- Reduced armor forces
- New long-range, land-based strike capabilities
- Sustained expeditionary forces for crisis response

- Increased funding for SOF persistent engagement
- Invested in capabilities for ops in denied environments: clandestine insertion and extraction, comms, identity masking




CSPRA

FULL BCA

- Increased cyber warfare capabilities
- Protected SATCOM, space situational awareness
- Post-GPS precision navigation

- Increased resiliency of Pacific basing posture
- Developed “at-sea” VLS reloading
- Initiated BRAC for CONUS




- Maintained nuclear triad
- Funded strategic modernization programs

FULL BCA

- Traded military end strength, civilian personnel, and contract support for robust future capabilities
- Reduced near-term readiness (1st FYDP) to support modernization


➤ Fully restored readiness in 2nd FYDP



HALF BCA

- Enhanced Pacific posture with additional dispersal locations, hardening, and rapid repair capabilities
 - Doubled investment compared to Full BCA

- Funded 100% readiness and full S&T investments over both FYDPs



- Prioritized developing the right capabilities mix over buying back more end strength

- Although further budget cuts are undesirable, may provide forcing function for needed rebalancing across military to meet future challenges
- At full BCA level cuts, however, significant reduction in readiness would be unavoidable
- Shift from full BCA to half BCA allowed team to fully protect readiness and shift faster toward development and fielding of key capabilities
 - Conscious decision under “Half BCA” scenario NOT to use relief to buy-back force structure and personnel
- **CAVEAT:** Exercise scenario represents the “best case” because teams had total flexibility to reallocate resources
 - Without such flexibility to address compensation, infrastructure and end-strength, cuts of these magnitudes will almost certainly result in far less capable future Joint Force