



Center for a
New American
Security

Portfolio Rebalancing Exercise

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* CNAS does not take institutional positions


Major rebalancing assumptions

- **2012 Defense Guidance provides a sound strategic framework**
 - Continue rebalance to Asia-Pacific
 - Remain engaged in Middle East, but with fewer boots on ground
 - No major near-term stability/COIN campaigns
 - Reduced military engagement in Europe, Africa, and South America
- **U.S. not likely to engage in direct, symmetrical conflict with a high-end adversary in the near to mid-term**
 - That said, U.S. is steadily losing its monopoly in guided munitions-battle network capabilities and (in some cases) capacities, which is weakening conventional deterrence and complicating its ability to project power
- **When combined with advances in additive manufacturing, big data, material sciences, nano- and bio-technology, and autonomous systems, we foresee a period of potential discontinuous change in the conduct of military operations**

Major rebalancing assumptions

- **We therefore foresee a shift toward a new warfighting regime (which we call “20YY”) in which:**
 - The U.S. faces adversaries with guided munitions-battle network parity
 - Cyber warfare is an integral part of warfighting doctrine at all levels of war
 - Robotic and autonomous unmanned platforms, sensors, and systems are ubiquitous in all operating domains
- **Viewed this exercise (which modeled rough effects of sequestration over ten years) as a major opportunity to begin a thoroughgoing reshaping of the Joint Force and industrial base**
 - Considered our choices within the context of a (minimum) four FYDP problem
- **Willing to take near-term risk to achieve a long-term payoff**
 - Smaller, but more networked and lethal force
 - Need to remain engaged globally, if at lower levels of effort, while freeing up slack for experimentation
 - Exploit the power of demonstrations

Minimum Four FYDP Strategy



Supporting design and industrial base strategy:

- 1950s – Transition from piston engines to jets
- 1960s – Missiles and space
- 1970s – Computers and digital electronics
- 1980s – Advanced aviation & stealth
- 1990s – Guided munitions and battle networking
- 2000s – Focus on warfighting
- This exercise – Focus on autonomous systems and robots

Full sequestration, Move 1: Assume Risk

- **General principles:**

- Cut overhead (BRAC, civilians) to greatest extent practical
- Adopt tiered readiness for all forces
- Preserve S&T (increase to greatest extent possible)
- To greatest extent possible, invest in weapons that attempt to address offensive dominance in guided munitions regime
 - Electric weapons (e.g., cyber, EM railgun, DEW, HPM weapons)
- To greatest extent possible, invest in autonomous unmanned systems and robotics
- Retain/emphasize globally responsive forces
 - Aerospace, naval, and special operations forces
 - Pursue high/low mix for naval and air forces
- Invest in overseas basing and global logistics forces (e.g., tenders) to greatest extent possible

Full sequestration, Move 1: Assume Risk

- **Specific choices:**
 - Retained nuclear triad
 - Less emphasis on ICBMs
 - Kept Ohio replacement program on track
 - Smaller campaign Army
 - Less focused on global shaping, more on institutional reshaping
 - Focus on active forces
 - Smaller tactical air forces
 - Hi-lo mix
 - 50% of force 5th generation by end of second FYDP
 - Smaller Navy
 - Hi-lo mix
 - Marine Corps to traditional expeditionary force in readiness role
 - Cut reserves
 - Retained special operations forces to greatest extent possible
 - Retained air and sea mobility forces to greatest extent possible

Full sequestration, Move 2: Invest heavily for 20YY


- **Choices in Move 1 allowed:**

- Rapid fielding of EM rail guns
- Accelerated procurement of unmanned systems
 - Invested in autonomy in Move 1 (and again in Move 2) across all domains

- **Savings in Move 1 allowed:**

- Increased investments in DEW
- Increased investments in space
- Increased investments in cyber
- Increased investments in munitions
- Increased investments in overseas infrastructure
(all unaffordable in Move 1)

Summary Graph



Half sequestration

- Same choices made during full sequestration; simply invested in autonomous and unmanned systems earlier and at higher levels
 - Bought back readiness

Conclusions

- **Sequestration not necessarily as big a problem as phasing**
 - We need to start reshaping the force for 20YY regardless of level of resources; sequestration simply jump starts the process
 - Did not have to hit year-by-year targets; big problem
- **Need to increase DoD's degrees of freedom**
 - Infrastructure (bases) BRAC
 - Compensation BRAC
 - Organizational/infrastructure BRAC (realignment)
- **Under any circumstances, have to accept substantial near-term risk**

Bottom-Line

We must prepare now to move toward the mature guided weapons and robotics regime