

# Patrol, Hold, Hope A Dream of Hegemony On the Cheap

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# **BLUF: Strategic Failure Ahead**

#### Global system, strategy demand global power

- Anything less than a two-theater force does not meet strategy
- Withdrawal from Middle East unhinges US global strategy

#### **Current program does not maintain two-theater force**

- AEI '2-1-1' strategy only delays decline
- 'Patrol' in East Asia, Middle East
- 'Hold' with airpower in one theater
- 'Hope' nuclear deterrence buys time for mobilization

#### Deeper cuts speed strategic failure

- Full sequestration cut increases near-term risk, ensures long-term risk
- Half sequestration slightly reduces near-term risk
- 'Balanced' risk is not 'acceptable' risk

# **Goals of Strategy**

#### Defense of the North American 'Homeland'

Includes Arctic, Canada, Caribbean Basin

#### Favorable global power balance

- 'Eurasian' theaters: Europe, Greater Middle East, South Asia, East Asia
- Security of Commons begins on the far shore

# Commercial access, local military advantage in 'Commons'

- Sea, air, space, cyberspace
- Access to Eurasia runs through Commons

#### 'Legitimate' international order

- Prevention, amelioration of humanitarian, natural disasters
- Expanding democratic governance

# PH2: A 'Tight-Rope' Strategy

#### Two big bets: Deterring China, rebuilding Middle East

- There can be no 'strategic pause'
- Balancing strategic 'breadth' and strategic 'depth'

#### **Covering the bets: Posturing the force**

- Pacific presence: Sea services to the front
- Middle East: Reestablishing toeholds ashore
- Air Force is the 'swing force'
- Greater reliance on nuclear deterrence

#### **Presence forces: Global tripwire**

- Sea services: Smaller and more modern
- Land forces: Retain manpower, selected modernization

#### Reinforcing forces: Strike and mobilize

- 'Two-war' Air Force with more long-range strike
- Recreate reserve components as 'strategic reserve'

### Sea Services Patrol Pacific

#### **Navy: Shrink and Modernize**

- <u>Sequester</u>: Retire 3 carriers; all cruisers, SSGNs; 40% F/A-18s; delay but increase F-35C; delay new SSBN
- <u>Half-sequester</u>: Retire 2 carriers, all cruisers, 1 ARG, 40% F/A-18; add F-35C, LCS, Next-gen cruiser, frigate, basing, DE/Railgun
- Increase readiness in Move 2
- No regular carrier presence in Gulf

#### **USMC: Shrink and Modernize**

- <u>Sequester:</u> Retire 2 ARGs; reduce USMC to 135K; preserve F-35B
- Half-sequester: Retire 1 ARG, Accelerate F-35B (also provide to allies)
- Increase readiness in Move 2
- 1 ARG Pacific, 1 ARG TBD

## Land Forces Patrol 'Middle East'

#### Army: Keep strength, delay modernization

- <u>Sequester</u>: 400K active duty; 500K RC; retire MRAP; terminate GCV; modernize helicopter fleet; develop and deploy IRBMs; S&T for electric/diesel drive, DE weapons, unmanned systems, G-RAMM
- Half-sequester: 450K active duty
- Increase readiness in Move 2
- Build FID and COIN partnerships in GME, retain heavy corps

#### SOF: More FID, Less 'manhunt'

- Sequester: Disband MARSOC, cut 1/3 SF and CA Btns; 1 SEAL team
- Half-sequester: Disband MARSOC, cut 1/3 SF and CA Btns; 1 SEAL team
- Indirect versus direct action

# Air Forces Hold with Global Firepower

#### **USAF:** Retain near-two-war size, modernize

- <u>Sequester</u>: Reduce Predator orbits by two-thirds; retire B-1s, C-5s, reduce
   B-52s by 40%; legacy fighters by 60%; accelerate new bomber
- <u>Half-sequester</u>: Increase F-35A by 60%, KC-46 by 50%, maintain C-17 line; add long-range AAM; add runway, shelter hardening
- Increase readiness in Move 2
- Most immediate area of operational and strategic risk

#### Strategic: Multilateral deterrence

- <u>Sequester:</u> Delay SSBN replacements, retire ICBMs
- Half-sequester: Retire ICBMs, add GPS satellites
- New deterrence calculus

# Final Thoughts

#### Mobilization: Requirement for decisive victory

- <u>Scenarios</u>: NORK collapse, China 'snatch,' return to COIN, Iran 'regime change'
- <u>Flash-to-bang</u>: Time to call up, train and deploy 'war-winning' force at least 6 months; irreducible operational risk
- Industrial mobilization would take longer
- <u>Allied</u> participation/mobilization uncertain
- Transition from CONUS to theater, 'off-shore' to 'on-shore' extremely risky

#### **Self-Inflicted wounds: Costs of retreat**

- Middle East: Not 'tide of war' receding but 'tide of American power'
- <u>East Asia:</u> Is China deterred?
- International system vulnerable to single-point failure